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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
%

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

t

JOHN FLETCHER PENDERGRASS,

:

Defendant-Appellant•

Case No. 900110-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions for murder in the
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-5-203 (1990), and theft, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (j) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

request for a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of
manslaughter on the grounds that there was no evidence to support
such a verdict?

Jury instructions are within the discretion of

the trial court and will only be reviewed for prejudicial error.
State v. Lopez# 789 P.2d 39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 919-920 (Utah 1987).

2.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in

excluding, on grounds of insufficient foundation, expert opinions
as to what effect defendant's voluntary drug ingestion would have
had on his ability to form the requisite intent?

Determinations

on the admissibility of expert testimony are reviewed only for a
clear abuse of discretion.

Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 608

(Utah 1974).
3.

Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on

the theory of accomplice?

This is a matter of discretion,

reviewable only for prejudicial error as stated in paragraph 1,
above.
4.

Did the trial court unconstitutionally restrict

defendant's testimony on the grounds that it had been
hypnotically enhanced; and, if so, did defendant properly raise
this issue below and preserve it for appeal?
be determined as a matter of law.

These issues must

Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44

(1987); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989)
5.

Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to

sustain defendant's conviction for murder in the second degree?
A jury verdict will be viewed in the light most favorable to
upholding it and will only be reversed where reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.

State v. Johnson,

774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989); State v. Jonas, 135 Utah Adv.
Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. May 22, 1990).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules for a determination of this case are set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, John Fletcher Pendergrass, was charged on
September 1, 1987, with criminal homicide, a first degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990), and theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1990) (R. 4-5). On September 28, 1987, the information was
amended to charge a single count of criminal homicide as a
capital felony (R. 7-8). From October 11 through 18, 1988, a
jury trial was held before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, Judge,
First Judicial District Court, Box Elder County, Utah (R. 30207).

Guilty verdicts were returned on charges of murder in the

second degree, a first degree felony, and theft, a second degree
felony (R. 290). On October 20, 1988, defendant was sentenced to
the statutory indeterminate terms of five years to life, with a
five year firearm enhancement term, and one to fifteen years,
respectively, with all sentences to run concurrently (R. 312).
On November 16, 1988, defendant filed a motion for new
trial based on the jury having received, during deliberations,
documents and photographs not admitted into evidence (R. 322-23).
The motion was granted on December 14, 1988 (R. 354). On April
30, 1989, after delays resulting from an interlocutory appeal,
the trial court ordered defendant to stand trial on charges of
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and theft (R.
420-21).
-3-

From September 26 through 29, 1989, a second jury trial
was commenced before Judge Low (R. 623, 627-30).

Verdicts of

guilty of murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and
theft, a second degrese felony, were returned on September 29,
1989 (R. 622). On October 11, 1989, defendant was sentenced to
the statutory indeterminate terms of five years to life and one
to fifteen years, respectively, to run concurrently.

Defendant

was also sentenced to a five year firearm enhancement term, which
the trial court ordered to run concurrently to the other
sentences (R. 648-649).

Defendant filed a notice of appeal to

the Utah Supreme Court on November 1, 1989 (R. 653). The case
was ordered "poured-over" to this Court on February 26, 1990 (R.
679).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 27, 1987, defendant decided to join the victim,
Ray Jenkins, on an overnight fishing trip to Willard Bay in
northern Utah (T. 31). The two had known each other for several
years (T. 32, 561-62).

In 1987, Ray Jenkins was 22 years old and

defendant was 18 (T. 56, 557).
The fishing trip had not been planned.

Ray had just

received another driving violation and felt the need to "get away
to relax" (T. 31). Because Ray did not have a valid driver's
license, he needed someone else to drive. When defendant showed
up at Ray's house in Clearfield, Utah, Ray asked him to join him.
Defendant agreed, saying he needed "to get away too" (T. 28, 31).
Ray and defendant left and went to defendant's parents' home in
Layton to get defendant's camping gear, including a cooler and
camp lantern (T. 33, 547)
-4-

Shortly after, they returned and packed Ray's gear (T.
34).

Ray packed two sleeping bags, clothes, food and his .22

caliber Rueger revolver (T. 35-36).

Ray and defendant left in

Ray's truck, along with Ray's two dogs (T. 39-40).

Gloria

Walters, Ray's live-in girlfriend, estimated that this all took
place between 2:45 p.m. and 3:30 p.m..

She never saw Ray alive

again (T. 27, 41).
Apparently, defendant and Ray then drove to Steven
Zaremba's house in Layton, Utah (T. 68-69).

Steve was not sure

when they arrived other than in the afternoon, but did remember
that Ray was upset about receiving another citation (T. 70, 73).
Ray was upset with defendant because defendant kept asking if he
could borrow Ray's truck to go to California.
said no, using an "upset" voice (T. 70-71).

Ray repeatedly

The two stayed at

Steve's house for 45 minutes to one hour (T. 74).
They then returned to defendant's parents' home about
4:30 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. (T. 527, 549). Defendant's parents
noticed that both Ray and defendant appeared to be "on something"
o
(T. 528, 550-51).

Defendant's mother gave him ten dollars and

they left (T. 552).
The next persons to see defendant and Ray were some
fishermen at Willard Bay.

Todd Farr and his cousin, Kevin

Christoffersen, had arrived at Willard Bay around 1:00 or 2:00 in
The truck was actually registered to Ray's girlfriend, Gloria
Walters, since Ray did not have a valid driver's license. But,
Gloria testified that the truck was Ray's (T. 29).
2
Defendant testified that before arriving at his parents' home,
he and Ray had shared a joint of marijuana (T. 578).
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the afternoon (T. 79). They fished near the inlet at the south
marina until 4:00 or 4:30 p.m., at which point they tried to
start Kevin's charger but were unable to do so (T. 80).
Observing defendant and Ray about a half-mile away, Todd walked
over to them for help (T. 84). Defendant and Ray came over to
the Christoffersen vehicle, which still would not start.

Kevin

offered them five dollars to drive Todd to get his truck (T. 85),
Ray agreed.

Todd got his truck and returned to the marina.

observed defendant and Ray in the same area fishing.

He

Kevin got

his charger started and Kevin and Todd left (T. 85-86).

It was

approximately 6:00 or 6:30 in the evening (T. 87-88).
During their encounter with defendant, Todd and Kevin
thought defendant appeared to be on drugs or lazy.

Todd

described defendant as follows:
He was out in another world because he
just — you couldn't talk to him. And it was
like he was on drugs. I'm almost positive he
was on. But he just didn't seem coherent.
He was lazy. I mean, even the Jenkins guy
asked. He was the only one that could get
him to do anything, get him out of the car.
Nobody else could get him out of the truck.
(T. 91). Kevin thought that defendant:
might have been smoking pot . . . . He just
seemed weird, the way he just sat there and
spaced-out looking and just a grin or a smirk
more or less on his face.
(T. 107-08).
Kevin was not sure that defendant was high; he thought
3
defendant might just have been lazy (T. 111). Defendant was

o

A subsequent defense witness, Michael Gale, who had been
defendant's neighbor for six or seven years, also testified that
defendant was lazy, never really wanting to get out and do any
type of work (T. 622).
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coherent enough to respond to Ray and appeared to understand his
surroundingsj it was just that he "sat like a bump on a log" (T.
94, 98). Both Kevin and Todd observed defendant with enough
physical coordination to repeatedly throw fish up in the air and
4
cut them in half with one of Ray's samurai swords (T. 83).
About the same time that Todd and Kevin were getting
the truck started, another family set up camp in the area.

The

Garretts arrived at the south marina around 6:30 or 7:00 in the
evening.

Both Mr. Garrett and his then ten year old son observed

Ray's truck across the canal (T. 443, 445, 501). The canal area
is connected by a footbridge and is near a camping and firepit
5
area (T. 248, 250). In all, there were about 12 to 13 campers
in the area, and others there for the day (T. 417). The Garretts
were the closest campers to the area of Ray's truck, and the only
ones to hear anything during the night (T. 417, 433-34).
Early in the evening, the Garretts observed several
young people on their side of the canal. Mr. Garrett and his son
observed two vehicles on the other side of the canal.

One was

Ray's truck and the other was a van, according to Mr. Garrett,
and a large car, according to his son (T. 455, 459, 501). The
Garrett family heard music which they thought came from a boom

The victim had two samurai swords with him in the truck. While
Gloria Walters had not seen the swords at the time Ray and
defendant left for Willard Bay, she subsequently described the
swords as Ray's (T. 46). Todd observed the swords both when
being used to slice the fish in half, and in the back of Ray's
truck on the way to Todd's house to get his truck (T. 83, 89).
5
By agreement of the parties, the jury was transported to
Willard Bay and viewed the scene (T. 421-23).
-7-

box type radio in the van (T. 450-51, 487). Because the
Garrett's son and Mrs. Garrett were sick, the family went to
sleep when it got dark, about 9:00 or 9:30 (T. 445-46).
During the night, Mr. and Mrs. Garrett heard one person
singing and another yelling (T. 448, 487). Both definitely only
heard only two people and both believed that the voices were
coming from the area where Ray's truck was (T. 448, 465, 487).
Mr. Garrett estimated that the yelling occurred sometime between
11:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. (T. 446). For 15 to 20 minutes after he
heard the yelling, all was quiet.

Then, Mr. Garrett heard:

a shot or shots. Kind of just one episode.
Then after that a little bit after that the
music came on again but it was for a short
time. It wasn't - I don't think it was more
than a minute long. It might be less than
that. Then it got quiet after that.
(T. 448). Mr. Garrett did not look outside his tent to see what
had occurred but heard a vehicle start up and leave (T. 449).
Mrs. Garrett remembered the incident somewhat differently.

She

thought that the singing and yelling had occurred closer to when
she went to bed, about 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. (T. 487). She did not
connect the singing with the earlier boom box music because that
van had already left (T. 487). The singing stopped, and then
sometime in the middle of the night, she heard the shots.
Afterwards, she heard music for a short time and then nothing (T.
487-488).

She did not hear any vehicle start up (T. 488). The

Garrett's then ten year old son did not hear any music or shots
during the night, but at one point, while he got sick outside the
tent, observed a large car leave the area on the Garrett's side

-8-

of the canal (T. 499-505).
In August, 1987, based on information received from
defendant, Ray's decomposed body was found hidden in some weeds
in the Willard Bay area (T. 296, 384-86).

He had been shot twice

in the head, by a small caliber weapon, probably a .22 or .25
caliber (T. 300-01).

It appeared that at the time of the

shooting, Ray was in his sleeping bag and lying with his head on
a pillow (T. 297, 301). The two wounds were inflicted by two
different but similar caliber guns, held in parallel position
approximately nine to eighteen inches above Ray's head and fired
simultaneously (T. 304, 307-08, 310-11, 332-33, 355-56).

Either

wound would have been fatal (T. 301).
The nature of the wounds would not have caused
substantial bleeding (T. 306). Because of the small caliber
weapons used, the fact that there were two wounds would not have
been readily apparent without being close to the body and pulling
back the victim's long hair (T. 306).
On the morning after the shooting, defendant drove
Ray's truck to a friend's home, telling him that he had traded a
stolen car for it (T. 140, 154-55, 192). Defendant and several
of his friends partied that morning at Cutler Dam with some girls
(T. 156, 186, 204). While at the dam, they drank beer and
whiskey and stabbed fish with Ray's samurai swords (T. 169, 180,
206).

Defendant told his friends that he was going to California

Even though the Garretts had been concerned when they heard the
shots, they did not report the matter. Instead, the next
morning, they left the area, as planned, to return home (T. 450).
In approximately September, 1987, after the victim's body had
been found, the police contacted the Garretts (T. 676-78).
-9-

and three of the boys decided to go with him (T. 157). They left
in Ray's truck (T. 157, 185, 209).
Along the way, defendant and his friends sold one of
Ray's samurai swords, his CB radio and other gear in the truck
for gas money (T. 160-61, 190, 210, 212). In Millard County,
they were questioned by the police (T. 209). Defendant and one
of the boys gave the police fictitious names, defendant stating
7
he was "Johnny Vicious" (T. 209, 229). The officer checked the
registration on the vehicle (T. 230). Defendant told the officer
that he had borrowed the car from Gloria Walters and was going to
Cedar City where his family lived to seek employment (T. 231).
The police were not able to contact Gloria for verification, but
determined that the car had not been reported stolen (T. 231-32).
After this incident, defendant threw out a lesather
holster that was in the car.

A passing motorist returned it to

him (T. 211). The leather holster had carried Ray's .22 Rueger,
the gun defendant subsequently admitted he had thrown away when
hiding Ray's body (T. 36, 575).
After Las Vegas, defendant and his friends stopped to
help a brother and sister in a stranded corvette, Ray Wilks and
Dominique (T. 194). While helping them, the police again
approached defendant, asking for the truck's registration.
Defendant told the police that the truck belonged to his
girlfriend (T. 199, 214).

The other two boys hid from the police behind some bushes (T.
188).
-10-

Once in California, defendant left his friends in an
arcade, saying that he would return.

He never did (T. 161, 198).

Approximately two months later, defendant was arrested
in California for having a loaded firearm in his vehicle, a .25
o

caliber semi-automatic (T. 419, 592).

Because Utah had an

outstanding forgery warrant for defendant, the Utah authorities
were notified of the arrest (T. 285-86).
On August 6, 1987, while still in custody, defendant
was interviewed by telephone by Lieutenant Steve Hill of the
Clearfield City Police (T. 286). At the time of the
conversation, the officer was aware that Jenkins was listed as a
missing person and that defendant was the last person known to be
with him (T. 287). Lt. Hill asked defendant:
where Ray was, that Ray was reported as
missing and we were concerned about him, his
family. And he indicated to me that Ray was
alive and well and staying in a house in
Ocean side [sic] or near Ocean Side [sic],
California.
(T. 287-88).

Defendant stated that he and Ray had gone to

California together (T. 288).
The Clearfield police dispatched two officers to
transport defendant back to Utah.

On the way back, defendant

told one of them that he and Ray had come to California together
and that Ray was now in Oceanside.

Defendant named a specific

street and described the home where he claimed Ray was staying.
While defendant subsequently claimed he thought the police were
o

This was not Ray Jenkins's gun, the .22 Rueger, which defendant
testified he threw into Willard Bay (T. 575). There was no
evidence presented as to any comparison done between this gun and
the bullets found.
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asking about Ray Wilks, the officer stated that defendant made
reference only to "Crazy Ray," which the officer knew to be Ray
Jenkins's nickname (T. 292-93, 586-87).
Once in Utah, defendant provided three taped interviews
to the police concerning the whereabouts of Ray Jenkins (T. 367).
The first occurred on August 20, 1987 (T. 367). In it,
defendant admitted that Ray was dead and drew a map of where the
body was located.

Defendant maintained that Ray had committed

suicide playing Russian roulette with his own .22 Rueger (T.
369).

Defendant stated:
that [he] and Mr. Jenkins had been camping at
the area of the south marina and for some
unknown reason Mr. Jenkins had pulled up this
firearm. Shot himself in the head and fell
back.

(T. 369-370).

Defendant said that they were in the back of the

vehicle, sitting on the tailgate when Ray shot himself.
Defendant put Ray into his sleeping bag, gathered up the camping
gear, and dumped the body and gear in an area west of the
shooting (T. 372). Defendant stated that Ray had only fired one
shot (T. 371). After giving this statement, defendant took the
police to Willard Bay area where he claimed he had dumped the
body, but no body could be found (T. 373-75).
On August 24, 1987, a second taped interview was given
(T. 368). At first defendant repeated the facts of his first
statement, but when other officers, whom defendant knew, came out
from behind a hidden screen, defendant broke down crying (T. 37980).

Defendant then told the police that they would find two

bullet holes in the body, and "indicated very quietly that it was

-12-

an accident."
381).

He did not explain how it was an "accident" (T.

Defendant drew another map for the body location.

Again,

no body was found (T. 382-83).
On August 26, 1987# the third interview took place (T.
368).

The police discussed the inconsistencies in defendant's

prior statements.

Defendant then stated that:

while he and Mr. Jenkins were sitting on the
back of the vehicle, Mr. Jenkins again shot
himself in the head, fell back in the truck
and while he was back in the truck he was
calling Mr. Pendergrass' name. So Mr.
Pendergrass picked up the gun and clipped
him in back of the truck and shot him.
. . .

He indicated that Mr. Jenkins called out his
name and he climbed in the back of the truck,
put him out of his misery and shot him in the
head with the same gun. With the same gun
which Jenkins had used.
(T. 392, 395). This time defendant drew a map and took the
police to a different area of Willard Bay than before and the
police recovered the body (T. 384-85, 386). Ray Jenkins's
skeletonized body was found in his sleeping bag; over it was a
large piece of carpeting and wood and foam which had been in the
back of Ray's truck; over this were torn off cattails (T. 296,
387).

Ray's pillow was found about 12 to 15 feet away.

Two

bullets were subsequently discovered in the pillow (T. 345-47,
389).

Ray's gun was never located.

Defendant told the police

that he had thrown the gun away when hiding the body (T. 390).
At trial, defendant admitted that the prior statements
were for the most part lies (T. 574, 588, 589-90, 593). He
testified that he and Ray had been using drugs throughout the
afternoon and evening (T. 567-69).
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Defendant claimed that on the

way to Willard Bay, he and Ray had shared a joint of marijuana
and then purchased a twelve pack of beer (T. 566-67).

From a

friend, he obtained an "eight ball" of cocaine, about 3 grams,
and two to three grams of crystal methane (speed) (T. 567).
Between 3:00 p.m. and approximately 6:30 p.m., defendant stated
that he consumed one half joint, eight beers, one quarter crystal
methane, one and a half grams cocaine, and vaguely recalled
consuming the remainder of the cocaine at some point (T. 584).
He testified that he remembered little of the evening, and did
not hear any shots or music during the night (T. 568, 570, 575).
In the morning, he awoke to find Ray dead in his sleeping bag.
He panicked and took off, dumping the body and anything bloody
into the bushes (T. 571-72).

Since the truck was stuck, he asked

some fishermen to help him, which they did.

He then went to his

friend's home (T. 573). He and his friend got the othesr friends,
went to the dam to party, and eventually left for California (T.
573-74).

He had no explanation for why he threw the gun away

with the body (T. 575).
Corwin Hess testified that while both he and defendant
were incarcerated in the Box Elder jail, defendant told him:
that he [defendant] was out camping out at
Willard Bay with one of his friends and that
him and his friend I guess he wanted to go to
California for something and wanted to use
his friend's truck. And at first his friend
told him he was going to let him. But I
guess at one point in the night they got in
an argument and got in a fight. He decided
not to take him.
(T. 257). Defendant's friend got in his sleeping bag and went to
sleep.

Defendant told Hess that defendant:
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got a gun from someplace. I [Hess] don't
remember whether it was out of the truck or
where it came from and said he shot him in
the head twice and drug him over to the weeds
and covered him up with a sheet of plywood.
(T. 258).
Other evidence will be discussed in the body of this
brief, as pertinent to the specific arguments.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court has discretion to instruct the jury as
appropriate to the facts of the case, and no error was committed
in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of
manslaughter or in instructing the jury on accomplice.
The trial court properly refused to allow qualified
experts to testify to their opinion of the effect of defendant's
claimed intoxication on his ability to form the requisite intent,
where the defendant failed to provide a sufficient factual
foundation as to what drugs had been consumed and over what time
period.

Even if error was committed, it was harmless in light of

defendant's defense that he did not commit the crime at all.
The trial court did not restrict defendant from
presenting his hypnotically enhanced testimony.

Even if

defendant had been restricted, this issue was not properly raised
below and defendant has waived it for purposes of appeal. Aside
from waiver, defendant has never claimed any prejudice; thus, any
error by the trial court would be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt•
The evidence, together with its reasonable inferences,
is sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for murder in the
second degree.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
MANSLAUGHTER WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE UPON
WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE REASONABLY
ACQUITTED DEFENDANT OF THE GREATER CHARGE AND
CONVICTED HIM OF THE LESSER.
The Utah appellate courts have consistently held that
the determination of appropriate jury instructions is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.
39, 45 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

State v. Lopez# 789 P.2d

As such, a trial court's ruling on

instructions will only be reviewed for a clear abuse of
discretion, and reversed solely for prejudicial error.

State v.

Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986); State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 919-920 (Utah 1987).
However, due process entitles a defendant to have the
jury instructed on his theory of the case.

Beck v. Alabama, 447

U.S. 625, 637 (1980); State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah
1984).

But, this right is not absolute; it is limited by the

evidence presented at trial.
(Utah 1983).

State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157

Thus, where as here, a defendant requests an

instruction on a lesser included offense, the trial court is
obligated to give the requested instruction only where:
there is a 'rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included
offense.'
State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17 (Utah May 30, 1990)
(quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159). It is not sufficient
that the evidence simply provides a basis to acquit of the
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greater offense, it must "simultaneously" provide a rational
basis for the jury to convict of the lesser.

State v. Larocco,

135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17; State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 790
(Utah 1984); State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983).
In the instant case, there is no question that
manslaughter would be considered a lesser included offense of
second degree murder.

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 529.

was no dispute on this in the lower court.

There

Rather, the issue

before the trial court was whether, based on the evidence, there
was a rational basis on which the jury could convict defendant of
the lesser offense (T. 631). To properly make such a
determination, the court was obligated to view the evidence in
the light most favorable to defendant and then, applying an
evidence-based standard, evaluate if a rational basis for
conviction existed.

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 532; State v.

Baker, 671 P.2d at 157. Here, the trial court properly did so.
The trial court noted that to convict defendant of
manslaughter, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990), the
jury would have to determine that defendant caused the death of
Ray Jenkins unlawfully and recklessly, disregarding a substantial
and unjustifiable risk with respect to the circumstances
surrounding his conduct, and that disregarding the risk
constituted a great deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances (T.
631).

Accord State v. Bolsinqer, 699 P.2d 1214, 1219-20 (Utah

1985); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1045-46 (Utah 1984)
(analyzing what constitutes depraved indifference for purposes of
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the second degree murder statute as opposed to mere
recklessness).

The court then directly asked counsel what

evidence supported such a theory where defendant was maintaining
that he did not kill Ray Jenkins under any circumstances (T. 583,
631).

Defense counsel offered in support:
1.
2.
3.

that defendant in his August 24 statement
to the police said it was an accident (T.
632);
that defendant stated he did not kill
Jenkins, that he could not kill his
friend (T. 632); and
that defendant stated that Jenkins killed
himself while playing Russian roulette
(T. 633).

The trial court properly concluded that such evidence was legally
insufficient to provide a basis for manslaughter (T. 634).
Specifically, the court noted, and defense counsel agreed, that
the statement that it was an accident was not, in context,
equivalent to saying that defendant accidently killed the victim
(T. 632-633).

(See original statement, T. 380-382).

Further,

defendant, while on the stand, admitted that his prior statement
to the police that Jenkins had been playing Russian roulette at
the time of his death was a lie (T. 588, 634). As stated
succinctly by defendant in his testimony, his defense was not
that of reckless conduct due to intoxication, it was that someone
else shot Jenkins (T. 583). Under these facts, a manslaughter
instruction was precluded by defendant's own theory of the case.
State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d at 790 (manslaughter instruction
inappropriate where the defense is that the defendant did not
kill the victim);

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d at 534 (if jury

believed defendant's denial of any involvement in killing,
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conviction on either the greater or lesser offense would be
precluded).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
EXPERT WITNESSES ON GROUNDS OF LACK OF
FOUNDATION.
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly
excluded the opinion testimony of expert witnesses on the issue
of what effect defendant's ingestion of drugs would have had on
his ability to form the requisite mental state for murder.

In

doing so, defendant contends that if an expert is qualified, he
may always give his opinion as long as the facts relied on are of
the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field (Br. of
App. at 15-16).

The error of defendant's argument is focusing on

the types of facts relied on, rather than their adequacy.
There is no question that rules 702 and 703, Utah Rules
of Evidence, allow a qualified expert to render an opinion based
on otherwise inadmissible information, if the underlying
information is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in
that particular field in rendering opinions.
without limitation.

But, this is not

The trial court must, as in any other

evidentiary matter, determine if the facts relied upon provide a
sufficient foundation for the opinion.

"The critical factor is

whether the expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of
fact in resolving the issues before it."
776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Schindler v. Schindler,

In making this

determination, the trial court has "considerable latitude of
discretion in the admissibility of expert testimony, and in the
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absence of a clear showing of abuse, [the appellate court] will
not reverse."

Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 1974).

Accord State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1225 (Utah 1986); State
v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982).
Here, the trial court concluded that Dr. C. A. Hilton,
a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Harvey P. Wheelwright, a
psychiatrist, were generally qualified to comment on the effect
of drugs on an individual (T. 650). However, when the defendant
attempted to solicit their specific opinions on whether or not
the alleged ingestion of drugs by defendant on May 27th could
have affected his ability to form the requisite intent for
homicide, the court precluded their testimony (T. 670, 688-89).
The court concluded:
The rule of evidence relative to the reliable
testimony of an expert does not allow
speculation. Based on what I've heard here
today, these two doctors are prepared to
testify that — they are prepared to tell us
that they can give an opinion relative to the
defendant's state of mind between eleven and
two o'clock. This court concludes that their
testimony is nothing more than speculation.
There's simply too many things they don't
know about what the defendant's situation was
between six o'clock and eleven o'clock.
Including some of which are the amount of
drugs involved. The amount of drugs consumed
by this person as opposed to Mr. Jenkins or
some other party who may have been there or
whether they were consumed at all. The time
period for which they were consumed. The
purity or potency of drugs or the effect of
poly-drugs poly-medications on the body. The
court concludes that testimony is unreliable.
Is based on speculation. And so therefore,
I'm going to sustain the objection. I don't
want to put all that in front of jury.
That's why I brought you in here. This Court
does not consider the proffer of testimony by
Dr. Hilton and Dr. Wheelwright to be
substantially and sufficiently based upon
-20-

reliable information upon which they may
express to this jury an opinion as to the
defendant's ability to form the necessary or
requisite intent at the time in question*
Therefore motion is [sic] and objection is
sustained.
(T. 688-89).
The State recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has
stated that a defendant should be allowed to present evidence,
including expert evidence, which would tend to negate any
specific intent charged.
1984).

State v. Miller# 677 P.2d 1129 (Utah

However, this view has only been applied where the

evidence presented would have been consistent with a defendant's
denial that he was not culpable due to his lack of intent.
at 1132.

Id.

Compare State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d at 1222 (testimony

allowed to disprove defendant's claim that co-defendant/witness
acted independently of her influence and direction).

Here, as

previously stated, the defense was not that defendant was
intoxicated at the time of the murder, but that he was not
involved in the murder in any way (T. 583). Only on appeal has
defendant argued that if he did kill Jenkins, he did so in an
intoxicated state (Br. of App. at 13-14).
More specifically, there was insufficient factual data
for the experts to draw any conclusion as to defendant's state of
mind at the time of the killing.
Dr. Hilton stated that any opinion of his would be
based simply on an assumption that the facts related to him by
defendant, a year after the crime, were truthful.

He compared it

to discussing whether someone was guilty of drunk driving without
having the benefit of a blood-alcohol level, stating:
-21-

So in reality# there isn't any scientific
basis anybody can argue from in terms of drug
levels.
(T. 642).

His only knowledge of what drugs had been consumed,

and when, was defendant's statement to him, which was:
They had — there were a large amount of
mixed drugs and alcohol. They had an eight
pack of beer. And he [defendant] figured he
probably had at least eight of that — or
twelve pack and he had about eight of the
twelve, perhaps ten of the twelve. Mr.
Jenkins had a stomach condition and did not
drink alcohol very much, though he used a lot
of other substances. They had smoked some
marijuana. And I think I was asking about,
you know, how good was the marijuana and he
was rating it not great but good, strong
marijuana. They stopped at a friend's house
who was a dealer and shot some crystal meth.
They picked up some cocaine which they call
an eight ball like three to three and a half
grams of cocaine. Had small needles to
inject that with and part of that he
injected. And then the other part he was
cooking up and smoking. So the cocaine was
in the form of what we call crack and it was
rock cocaine. A little more potent, lasts a
little less longer but hits very hard. It's
one of his favorite drugs. So he had beer,
marijuana, methadrine speed, and crack form.
And coke in crack form. It was crystallized.
(T. 653-54).

The doctor testified that defendant told him he had

consumed the above drugs between 3:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. (T.
654).

When objections were made by the prosecutor to the doctor

rendering an opinion as to defendant's state of mind between
11:00 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., the time of the killing, the court
sustained the objections on foundational grounds in that there
was insufficient foundation as to what drugs were taken when and
in what amounts (T. 657).
Additional questions were asked to which the doctor
responded:
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The marijuana they smoked early afternoon say
one o'clock. They had smoked a joint. They
picked up the beer after three o'clock. They
stopped at the dealer's house I think when he
told me first. He wasn't exactly sure
whether that was before or after, but when I
subsequently asked him, he clarified that.
The coke he said was three and a half grams.
They got that about four. That was between
say on, three, four and getting out to
Willard Bay around five o'clock. It's about
an hour apart, I think, for starting on the
drugs. They shot a quarter gram of crystal
meth at the dealer's house when they picked
up the coke. That was kind of like a little
welcome thing as part of the deal. And they
started using the coke. He also had some
crystal meth that he himself had
manufactured. And it was out there too. So
you can say on the alcohol, for example,
that's thes [sic] only drug we know. We know
what's in a can of beer. That's one we know
and the percent. His size and weight you can
calculate saying 180 pound person who
consumes so many cans of beer, your liver
will clear about a can of beer an hour
roughly. So he would have been say legally
drunk by four o'clock in the afternoon. . . .
(T. 658-59).

The doctor continued to explain that even though

defendant told him he was trying to "stay up" with the drugs by
using again about every hour, at this point defendant's memory
got "very fuzzy," "very flakey," and defendant "couldn't remember
exactly what he did after, what did happen after about six or
seven o'clock" (T. 660). Defendant did remember that he was out
of drugs by the time it was dark, about 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. (T.
661).

Again, objections were made to the hypothetical question

and sustained on the basis of form and foundation (T. 662-64,
666).

The court noted its concern that there was still

insufficient foundation as to when and what was actually consumed
by defendant (T. 667-68).

The court continued to allow the

defense an opportunity to establish adequate foundation.
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Counsel

attempted a few more questions and then stated to the court,
•'Well, your honor, I guess we just can't give you the quality or
the quantity" (T. 670). To which the court responded that the
doctor was not in a "position to testify as to what effect the
consumption of certain unquantified drugs could have on an
individual" (T. 670). Defense counsel stated, "Okay.

That's all

I have" (T. 670).
Similarly, when Dr. Wheelwright testified, the trial
court properly restricted his opinion.

Dr. Wheelwright's

information was based on a review of Dr. Hilton's report and a
conversation with defendant during trial (T. 673). On voir dire,
Dr. Wheelwright admitted that to render a valid opinion he would
need to know the length of time over which any drugs were
consumed.

In this case, defendant related to the doctor that he

began taking drugs at 3:45 p.m. and continued to about 8:30 or
9:00 p.m., but could not remember, except for brief periods,
anything after 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. (T. 677). The timing of what he
took was also "a little vague."

Basically, defendant told the

doctor that he must have consumed all or most of the drugs
between 3:45 and 6:00 p.m. because there were none left in the
morning (T. 678). The doctor was not sure if the amount of
marijuana was smoked by defendant only or shared with another (T.
679).

Defendant told him that approximately "15 hits or doses of

a quarter gram each" of cocaine had been smoked between 4:00 and
6:00 p.m., but did not specify how much had been used by Jenkins
or his "friends" (T. 680). When questioned as to defendant's
inconsistent statements that he had smoked the cocaine every
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fifteen to twenty minutes between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m.# i.e.,

six

hits or lines, and that he had smoked ten or fifteen lines (T.
680, 682), the doctor repeated that defendant had just assumed he
had taken that much because it was all gone in the morning and
drug users typically use whatever is available (T. 682-83).
Further, the doctor admitted that it would make a difference in
rendering an accurate opinion to know what, if anything,
defendant had consumed between 6:00 and 11:00 p.m., and how the
drugs were consumed (T. 684-685).

The doctor stated that while

there was research on the effects of individual drugs, there was
no "solid scientific research" of the ultimate effects of polydrug intoxication (T. 686). Thereafter, the court concluded that
there was insufficient foundation for Dr. Wheelwright's opinion
to be anything but mere speculation (T. 688-89).
It is clear that the trial court, given the
insufficiency of the facts concerning what drugs had been
consumed and when, properly exercised its discretion in
sustaining the objections to the hypothetical questions as asked.
But, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred, any error
would be harmless.

Indeed, defendant has not even alleged on

appeal that he was prejudiced (Br. of App., Point II). Testimony
was presented through various witnesses, including defendant,
that at least at 6:00 p.m. on May 27th, he appeared to be under
the influence of drugs or alcohol (T. 91, 107-08, 528, 553, 568).
Even the experts were allowed to state that based on defendant's
statements, defendant could have been considered legally drunk
and had consumed a large amount of potent drugs (T. 659, 674).
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Clearly, the defense was not precluded from presenting evidence
of drug use.

The problem was that no one, including defendant,

could relate any facts about what occurred after 6s00 p.m., some
five to eight hours prior to the time of the killing.

Further,

whatever state of mind defendant had at the time of the killing
has little determinative value as to the jury's determination of
whether or not defendant was involved in the killing.

Defendant

never argued that his drug intoxication negated any requisite
intent; instead, he argued that the intoxication was supportive,
and corroborative of defendant's testimony that he did not know
what had happened (T\ 583, 717-18).

Even if the experts had

expressed an opinion as to defendant's ability to form any
requisite intent, such testimony would not have had a substantial
likelihood of affecting the outcome of defendant's case.
such, its exclusion, even if error, is harmless.

As

State v.

Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS
DISCRETION IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY CONCERNING
ACCOMPLICES.
As previously stated in Point I of this brief, the
trial court's determination of what jury instructions are
appropriate, based on the evidence in a case, is within the
court's sound exercise of discretion.
Here, the court instructed the jury that:
Every person, who acts with the mental
state required for the commission of an
offense, who solicits, requests, commands,
encourages, or intentionally aids another
person or persons to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense, shall be equally
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guilty as the person who directly commits the
offense.
(R. 597, Court's Instruction No. 7). As defendant concedes, the
instruction merely tracks the language of the aiding and abetting
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) (Br. of App. at 19).
When defendant objected to the instruction, the court responded
that it was a jury issue as to whether or not defendant aided the
other persons he was contending had committed the murder (T.
691).
Defendant argues on appeal that the instruction was
improper because no one else was ever charged (Br. of App. at 1920).

Such an argument is specious in light of Utah Code Ann.

S 76-2-203 (1990), which states;
In any prosecution in which an actor's
criminal responsibility is based on the
conduct of another, it is no defense:
. . .

(2) That the person for whose conduct
the actor is criminally responsible has been
acquitted, has not been prosecuted or
convicted, has been convicted of a different
offense or of a different type of class of
offense or is immune from prosecution.
Defendant's other argument, that the evidence did not
support such an instruction, is equally without merit.

Here, the

State's primary theory was that defendant had committed the
crime.

In refuting this, the defense presented testimony from

Mr. Garrett that at sometime prior to the shooting, other persons
appeared to be with defendant and the victim, and, at the time of
the shooting, that another vehicle left the area (T. 488-89).
Additionally, based on the different markings on the recovered
bullets, the State's expert ballistic witness testified that two
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guns appeared to have been used simultaneously
355-56, 359-60).

(T. 308, 313,

There was no dispute that defendant was with

Ray Jenkins at the time he was killed, that defendant hid
Jenkins' body and much of the bloody evidence, that he threw away
Jenkins' gun such that it was never discovered, that he took
Jenkins' truck to California, and that he lied to his friends as
to how he got the truck.

Further, defendant gave the police

conflicting statements as to what occurred on the night in
question, including giving false information as to where the body
was.

Based on the evidence, the jury could have concluded that

more than one person was involved in Jenkins' death, but that,
defendant's presence at the scene, concealment of the body and
evidence afterwards, and direct benefit of receiving Jenkins'
truck and belongings negated his claim that he did not
participate in the crime. As such, an accomplice instruction was
appropriate.

See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah

1982) (aiding instruction proper where defendant present at time
of presentation of check but claiming that another forged it).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RESTRICT DEFENDANT'S
TESTIMONY ON GROUNDS THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN
HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED; AND, DEFENDANT FAILED
TO PROPERLY RAISE OR PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR
PURPOSES OF APPEAL.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed
constitutional error by allegedly restricting defendant from
identifying which parts of his testimony had been hypnotically
enhanced.

Further, he urges this Court to remand the case for a

determination of whether procedural safeguards were used when
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defendant was hypnotized (Br. of App. at 22).

Notably,

defendant, while arguing error, does not even raise the issue of
whether or not defendant's presentation of evidence was
prejudiced.
Defendant appropriately begins his discussion with Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), but misapplies its holding.
Rock v. Arkansas, as defendant notes, held that a state may not
impose a per se prohibition against hypnotically enhanced
testimony such that a defendant is arbitrarily denied an
opportunity to testify.

Ld. at 61. The Court did not "endorse

without qualifications the use of hypnosis as an investigative
tool;" its concern was with a wholesale prevention of all of a
defendant's testimony.

J^i. But, nothing in the decision shifted

defendant's foundational burden to establish that proper
procedural safeguards were utilized in hypnotizing a defendant,
such that the post-hypnotic testimony had some trustworthiness
and reliability.

Ixi. at 60-61.

Accord State v. Holden, 554

So.2d 121, 126-127 (La.App.2 Cir. 1989) ("The party seeking to
introduce hypnotically enhanced testimony has the burden of
establishing admissibility by clear and convincing evidence,"
even where the testimony is that of defendant's); State v. Alley,
776 S.W.2d 506, 516 (Tenn. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 758
(1990) (reliability is still a weighing factor the court must
consider before admitting hypnotically enhanced statements of a
defendant); People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1021 (Colo. 1987),
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 990 (1988) (proponent of hypnotically
enhanced testimony must establish its reliability by clear and
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convincing evidence).

As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the

holding in Rock must be narrowly applied.

State v. Tuttle# 780

P.2d 1203, 1211 n.9 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1323
(1990).
Apparently sometime prior to trial, defendant was
hypnotized. (See R. 535-37, State's Motion in Limine to Prohibit
Evidence of Hypnosis).

Recognizing that a defendant should not

arbitrarily be restricted from testifying, the State did not move
pretrial to factually limit any of defendant's testimony, but
requested that defendant simply be allowed to testify to his now
present recall of the events without reference to the fact that
it was hypnotically enhanced (R. 535-36).

The record does not

evidence any response to the motion by defendant or any hearing
on the matter.
When defendant testified, the State raised no
objections to any portion of that testimony on the grounds that
defendant's memory had been hypnotically enhanced (T. 556-75).
Nor did the State cross-examine defendant by distinguishing
specifically his pre- and post-hypnotic recall (T. 576-98).

The

State did refer twice to prior statements of defendant's made to
Dr. Hilton, but did not in any way refer to those statements as
o
having been made under hypnosis (T. 597-98).
Despite this, on
redirect, defense counsel asked:

Dr. Hilton interviewed defendant for purposes of evaluating his
sanity (R. 94, 106). Additionally, the defense requested
separately that defendant be hypnotized (R. 87-88). It is
unclear from the record when and by whom defendant was
hypnotized.
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Q [Mr. Dorius] You indicated on cross
examination that you could recall some of
these items because of hypnotism?
A [Defendant]
Q

Yes, sir.

You've been hypnotized?

Mr. Bunderson: Could we approach the
bench, your honor.
(T. 598). An off-the-record conference then occurred (T. 59899).

When court resumed, defense counsel proceeded with other

questions.
No further mention of hypnosis occurred until after
both parties had rested.

At that point, defendant noted an

exception to Jury Instruction No. 11 on hypnosis (R. 601), in
that "the defendant only responded that he had been hypnotized,
but [was] not allowed to testify to any any [sic] hypnotic
testimony" (T. 691).

In response the trial court asked:

THE COURT: Just a moment. Are you
suggesting that this court precluded his
testimony?
MR. DORIUS. No.

Defendant has not raised on appeal the issue of the court's
instruction on hypnosis, except as a passing reference:
It was reversible error for the trial court
to prevent the defendant from testifying as
to which portions of his testimony had been
refreshed by hypnosis, and to instruct the
jury concerning hypnotic testimony.
(Br. of App. at 20). Since no further argument is presented nor
any authorities cited, it is presumed that defendant has waived
this issue on appeal. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Additionally, while there is little
authority, the courts which have addressed the issue favor a
cautionary instruction when hypnotically enhanced testimony is
presented. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. at 61; State v. Holden,
554 So.2d at 126. See also 101 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 124 (1987)
(noting jury's tendency to unduly credit hypnotically refreshed
testimony).
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THE COURT: What's the objection then? He
did testify that some of his testimony was in
fact remembered after hypnosis.
MR. DORIUS: But the Court granted the
State's exception for the defendant to ask
any questions regarding what the hypnotic
testimony was.
THE COURT:

Say that again.

MR. DORIUS: I say the State's objection was
upheld by the Court from the defendant
introducing any evidence or asking any
testimony as to what the hypnotic testimony
was that he had recollected.
MR. BUNDERSON: You mean you felt you were
barred from specifying that portion which was
hypnotically enhanced?
MR. DORIUS:

That's correct.

THE COURT: That question wasn't asked and
any evidence which was hypnotically enhanced
would be excluded anyway. But you didn't ask
the question which testimony he was giving.
He simply answered the question his
recollection was helped because of hypnosis.
MR. DORIUS: As I understood, we were not
able to proceed asking any questions
regarding which of the testimony had been
hypnotically enhanced.
THE COURT: That wasn't the Court's intention
nor was that question asked. Because of the
inference was given by the witness that
certain of his testimony was hypnotically
enhanced, the instruction was proffered.
MR. DORIUS: I believe that's the only
exceptions I have.
(T. 691-92.)
rhe trial court did not unconstitutionally restrict defendant
from testifying.

Counsel simply did not raise or argue the

issue, if there was one, as to any other aspects of the hypnotic
testimony he wished to present.

State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29,

35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).
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Further, even if counsel had timely raised the issue
below, the record does not in any way reflect what aspects of
defendant's testimony related to pre- or post-hypnotic recall.
Nor has defendant even specified such on appeal.

Even assuming

arguendo that the trial court erred, defendant has totally failed
to identify how this error could have prejudiced him.

Therefore,

this Court must presume that any error would be harmless.
v. Knight# 734 P.2d at 919-920.

State

See also State v. Julian, 771

P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989), and cases cited therein (defendant
has burden of establishing prejudice).
POINT IV
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR MURDER IN THE
SECOND DEGREE.
Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial
is insufficient to support his conviction for murder in the
second degree as defined, in pertinent part, under Utah Code Ann.
S 76-5-203 (1990), which reads:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in
the second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes
the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily
injury to another, he commits an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death
of another;
(c) acting under circumstances
evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life, he engages in conduct which creates a
grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another[.]
Defendant does not challenge his conviction for theft (Br. of
App. at 22-25).
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Here, the jury was fully advised as to each element of
the offense charged.
the Jury).

(See R. 590-621, Court's Instructions to

No issue has been raised on appeal as to th€> adequacy

of the jury instructions except as to the manslaughter emd
accomplice instructions, discussed previously.
The standard for review of a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge is well-established by the Utah appellate
courts.
[T]he evidence and the reasonable inferences
which may be drawn therefrom must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. A jury conviction is reversed for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he*
was convicted.
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989).

Accord State

v. Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 39 (Utah Ct. App. May 22, 1990);
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Further, since a jury is in the best position to give "proper
weight to the peripheral nature of [any] contradictory
testimony," State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah Ct. App.
1988):
It is not this court's duty to measure
conflicting evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. That responsibility belongs
strictly to the trier of fact. 'It is the
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
evidence and to determine the credibility of
the witnesses' . . . .
So long as there is
some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all
requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, [the court's] inquiry
stops. • • •
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J^L at 27 (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)
(citations omitted)).

Accord State v. Hopkinsf 782 P.2d 475

(Utah 1989) (an appellate court "does not have the prerogative to
substitute its judgment on the credibility of witnesses for that
of the fact-finder").
Unless the prosecution's account of the facts appears
to be so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must necessarily
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime charged, a reviewing court is obligated to assume the
jury believed the evidence which supports the jury's verdict.
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981).

Nor will a

conviction be overturned merely because the jury chose to
disbelieve the defendant.

State v. Lactodf 761 P.2d at 27.

Accord State v. Jonas, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40.
jury's prerogative to determine the facts.

It is the

Further, the State's

burden in a circumstantial case is no different than its burden
in any case, that is, to prove defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755-56 (Utah

1986); State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, there was sufficient evidence that defendant killed Ray
Jenkins.

By defendant's own testimony, he was the only person

known to be with the victim at the time of his death.

The

unrefuted evidence established that prior to going to Willard
Bay, defendant and the victim argued about defendant taking Ray's
truck to California (T. 70-71).

During the night, the Garretts

heard yelling from the direction of defendant and Ray's camp area
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(T. 448/ 487). The next morning, defendant hid Ray's body and
all the evidence of the crime (T. 372, 387, 389, 390, 571-72).
He then proceeded to take Ray's truck and party with his friends
(T. 152, 156, 183, 206). He told no one about Ray or how he had
truely come to acquire the truck (T. 593). When questioned by
the police, he falsified accounts of what happened (T. 527, 588,
589-90).

Prior to the discovery of the body, defendant told the

police that Ray had been shot twice, a fact which Dr. Sweeney had
testified would not have been readily apparent without looking
closely at the body and pulling back Ray's hair (T. 306, 380).
He admitted at one point to the police that he had shot
Ray "to put him out of his misery" after Ray had shot himself but
while he was still alive (T. 392, 395). He admitted to at least
one, and possibly two jail inmates, that he had killed Ray (T.
222, 225-26, 257-58).
The only evidence which defendant can point to in
support of his theory that someone else shot Ray is that two
weapons were used and that Mr. Garrett thought he heard a car
leave the area.

As to the former, the expert testimony was that

while it appeared that two different weapons were used, they were
used simultaneously while in a parallel position (T. 307-08, 31011, 313). Further, it would appear inferentially that at least
one of those weapons was Ray's .22 Rueger.

It is true that,

while several inferences exist as to what other weapon could have
been used, there was no weapon introduced as the murder weapon.
However, the State has no burden to produce such evidence where
there is no dispute that the victim was unlawfully killed by a
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firearm.

It is simply one aspect of the evidence in the same

category as any other evidence.

Its introduction alone would not

necessarily establish defendant's guilt any more than its absence
alone can negate his culpability.

This is especially true when

defendant admits he threw away the only weapon found at the scene
(T. 575).
As to the Garretts' testimony, the jury was free to
determine what weight to give it.

Mr. Garrett thought he heard,

but was not in a position to see, a vehicle leave defendant's and
Ray's side of the canal (T. 449). Mrs. Garrett never heard a
vehicle leave from any location (T. 487). Their young son saw a
vehicle leave the Garretts' side of the canal (T. 505). Again,
in light of all the other evidence, this does not create a
reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt.
Based on the totality of the evidence, together with
all reasonable inferences, the jury verdict is adequately
supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions for
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, and theft, a
second degree felony, should be affirmed.
DATED this <£

day of July, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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